We belong together? A plea for modesty in modal plural logic by Hewitt, Simon
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
08
42
4v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  2
6 D
ec
 20
16
WE BELONG TOGETHER? A PLEA FOR MODESTY IN MODAL PLURAL LOGIC
SIMON THOMAS HEWITT
‘We belong together’, a doey eyed lover says to his beloved. She, being both better educated
in a certain sort of metaphysics than her suitor and more romantic, responds ‘Yes. Not only in the
actual world, but in every possible world. There is no possible world in which we are not together’.
Whether this is genuinely touching or simply emetic is a fine judgement. Perhaps more remarkably
this expression of lovestruck hyperbole bears a striking similarity to a principle enshrined as current
orthodoxy in discussions of the modal logic of plurals. Let xx be some things; then, goes one half of
the claim, if x is one of xx then necessarily: if xx exist, then x is one of xx. Similarly, if x is not one
of xx then necessarily: if xx exist, then x is not one of xx. The path from love to logic is a short one
indeed.
Why should this be of any more than esoteric interest? The principle, which sometimes get
calls plural rigidity1 is put to work to important and controversial metaphysical ends. Crucially,
Williamson deploys it in arguing both for necessitism (the doctrine that ontology is modally in-
variant) and for a property-based interpretation of second-order quantification (since he thinks the
modal behaviour of plurals rules out a Boolos style plural interpretation) ((Williamson, 2013))
(Williamson (2010)) (Boolos (1998c)). Linnebo develops a foundational programme for set-theory
in a modal plural logic strengthened by the addition of statements equivalent to the principle, and
whilst he himself proposes a non-standard interpretation of the modalities, its acceptablity with re-
spect to metaphysical modality would provide a fall-back position for someone sympathetic to the
approach (Linnebo (2013)). Relatedly, so-called rigidity would prevent a development of Hellman’s
modal structuralism about mathematics using a plural interpretation of second-order logic (Hellman
(1989)).
A number of current philosophical projects, then, turn on this particular claim about the modal
behaviour of pluralities2. Yet it is often adopted swiftly without the sustained argument which might
reasonably be thought to be required to sustain a claim with such wide-ranging consequences. Re-
cently, Linnebo has made in the direction of making good this deficiency (Linnebo (2016)). The
present paper argues that Linnebo fails to supply sufficient reasons to adopt the claim at issue, and
that in the absence of alternative arguments a question mark must hang over standard appeals to
strong modal logics of plurals by philosophers. Of necessity, given the current state of the litera-
ture and the importance of Linnebo’s work, much of what follows consists of a close criticism of
Linnebo, but I go on to suggest that progress in the debate requires us to get clear about the relation-
ship between language and non-linguistic reality and to pay close attention to linguistic use. These
thoughts look likely to generalise across the philosophy of modal logic and to call into question
much of the present fashion for modalising.
I will assume a working knowledge of customary notation and formation rules for plural logic.
Good introductions are available in the form of Linnebo (2012) and Rayo (2007). A brief overview
is provided here in an appendix. Whilst it is standard to offer informal interpretations of modal
languages by means of possible-worlds, as the appendix here does for the sake of brevity, the meta-
physical associations of this are unhelpful in the present context and present the danger of building
in a bias towards semantic realism that sits uncomfortably with suggestions I want to make. I will
1I will object to this usage below.
2Here, and throughout, ‘plurality’ is a convenient singularising locution, as is standard in the literature: a plurality is some
things.
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therefore deploy the less-worn language of truth with respect to possibilities or else simply interpret
modal operators homophonically. After all, if we do not have a working understanding of expres-
sions such as ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ what do we take modal logics to be interpreting3?
The paper proceeds as follows. §1 lays out the issue to be discussed, and undermines initial mo-
tivation for it. §§2-4 work through Linnebo’s formal arguments, diagnosing a common justificatory
circularity. §5 situates the sceptical position thus arrived at methodologically. I urge caution in the
invocation of such a strong modal claim for philosophical argument in the absence of more persua-
sive arguments for its truth. I suggest that more attention needs to be paid to the use of language in
making assertitions and performing deductions as a key, and perhaps the only, constraint on decid-
ing the acceptability of candidate logical principles. This position looks likely to have implications
beyond the present case, and to call into question standardly accepted modal axioms.
1.
What Linnebo terms plural rigidity, we will call plural necessitism. The expression is still not
perfect (it might suggest a deeper association with Williamson’s metaphysics than can be supported),
but at least avoids the danger of use-mention confusion that attaches to using the word ‘rigidity’ of
a principle stated in the material, rather than formal, mode4. Plural necessitism is equivalent to the
conjunction of:
(NecInc) x ≺ yy → (Ex ∧ Eyy → x ≺ yy)
(NecNInc) x ⊀ yy → (Ex ∧ Eyy → x ⊀ yy)
Here ‘E’ is to be read as an existence predicate5, allowing us to work within a variable domain
framework. It is routine to modify (NecInc) and (NecNInc) for a fixed domain framework simply
by removing the conjunction sign and the second conjunct from the antecedent of the second con-
ditional of each formula. In what follows, versions of the principles with and without existence
predicates will be denoted by ‘(NecInc)’ and ‘(NecNInc)’, with context serving to disambiguate.
As we have seen, plural necessitism plays a non-negligible part in motivating or supporting meta-
physically contentious positions. What reason, then is there to believe that it is true? It is provably
independent of any normal modalisation of PFO+ (Hewitt (2012)). Motivation will therefore have to
take the form of formal argument from independently compelling premises or of informal arguments.
As advertised above, our engagement will be mainly with the formal arguments Linnebo offers
in support of plural necessitism (hereafter pn). Before that, some comment should be made on a
case for the plausibility of pn which Linnebo develops by analogy with an argument for the modal
invariance of set membership, based on extensionality and the necessity of identity6. This proceeds
from the principle:
3I take ‘modal logic’ here to have the sense customary in philosophy, where interpretation is restricted to alethic, and in
particular often metaphysical, modalities. Of course, considered as mathematical formalisms, modal logics are interesting
in themselves and have a wide variety of applications. For a survey and introduction see Blackburn et al. (2002). Regarding
interpretation, I find the suggestion that Kripke semantics – undoubtedly useful for simplifying proof technique, through
construction of counter-models and the like – shed light on hitherto unanswered questions about the meaning of modal
operators quite incredible. Nonetheless, my impression is that it is part of philosophical folklore. It is made explicit at (Priest,
2015, 121).
4Linnebo himself is keenly aware of this danger ((Linnebo, 2016, 7)).
5Strictly speaking, we may need to be more careful. We have not formally specified a lexicon, and in particular have not
settled the question whether predicates may be untyped, in the sense that they may have argument places for which either
singular or plural terms are eligible. From the perspective of tractable formation rules, proof theory and model theory, it
is likely to be easier to type predicates. If the lexicon is typed, then ‘E’ is doing illegitimate double work in (NecInc) and
(NecNInc) as formulated. We can get round this straightforwardly, by using superscripts to signify the type of existence
predicates in the formal specification of the lexicon, and then omit superscripts in practice as a harmless convention.
6The case for the necessity of identity invoked in that developed by Barcan Marcus in (Marcus (1961)).
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(Indisc) xx ≡ yy → (φ(xx) ↔ φ(yy))
The subformula ‘xx ≡ yy’ abbreviates ‘∀u(u ≺ xx ↔ u ≺ yy)’. This relieves us from the need
to read ‘≡’ as denoting identity on pluralities. This is dialectically useful, since the extent of the
similarity of behaviour (in modal contexts) between the referrents of singular and of plural terms is
what is at issue. From (Indisc) is derivable7 :
(Cov) xx ≡ yy → (xx ≡ yy)
Now (Cov) does not entail pn, since it is compatible with pluralities ‘drifting’ modally. This is
easiest to understand using a possible worlds heuristic. Suppose that, at some world w1, xx just are
yy. In order for (Cov) to be satisfied, we require that at any world accessible from w1, xx just are yy.
But now consider w2, accessible from w1, such that xx and yy both consist of the members of those
pluralities at w1 with the addition of a, which does not exist at w1. We have here no counter-example
to (Cov), but pn fails8.
Linnebo takes this drift to be indicative of soft extensionalism about pluralities. This is, staying
with the possible worlds talk, the doctrine that extensionality holds within worlds but not across
them. He argues that this is an unstable position, for the same reason that he holds the parallel po-
sition regarding sets to be unsuccessful. With respect to the latter, he draws a comparison between
sets and groups, where a group is understood as a social entity, such as the Supreme Court justices
or the Celtic first eleven:
The only reason to accept the principle of extensionality [for sets]. . . is that a set,
unlike a group, is fully specified by its elements. Thus, when tracking a set across
possible worlds, there is nothing other than the elements to go on. This ensures that
the tracking is rigid. By contrast, when tracking a group, there is more than the
members to go on. . . These considerations give rise to a dilemma that applies not
only to sets but to any other notion of collection: either we have to give up the prin-
ciple of extensionality, or else we have to accept the rigidity principle. There is no
stable middle ground. Kripke famously taught us that there can be no ‘soft identity
theory’ in the philosophy of mind, according to which mental states are identical
with physical ones, but only contingently so, only the ‘hard identity theory’ com-
mitted to necessary identity. Our present conclusion is analogous. There can be
no ‘soft extensionalism’ concerning sets of other kinds of collection, only ‘hard
extensionalism’ that incorporates the rigidity claims and the idea of transworld ex-
tensionality that they embody. ((Linnebo, 2016, 6))
This is surely correct as regards sets: as Boolos once put the point, if anything deserves to be
called analytic of our concept of set it is the axiom of extensionality ((Boolos, 1998a)), and the
move from this recognition to the claim that possession of all and only its actual elements is an
essential property of any given set is a natural one. The present issue, however, is whether this form
of reasoning transfers across to the plural case. And here a number of questions arise. Most fun-
damentally, it is not entirely obvious that pluralities need be regarded as extensional in any sense:
the temptation to think this as immediate as it is in the set-theoretic case arises from the truism ‘a
plurality just is its members9’. So far, so uncontroversial: the cutlery set represents no addition of
being over and above the knife, the fork, and the spoon. Does extensionality follow? Unspoken in
7Proof sketch: (1) xx ≡ yy (Ass for CP), (2) φ(xx) ≡ φ(yy) ((1, Indisc)), (3) (xx ≡ xx) ↔ (xx ≡ xx) (Thm), (4) (xx ≡ yy) ↔
(yy ≡ xx) (3, 2), (5) (yy ≡ xx) (1, 4, MP), (6) xx ≡ yy → (xx ≡ yy) (1-5, CP).
8Compare the counter-model to (NecInc) provided (within a fixed domain semantics) in (Hewitt (2012)).
9It is a nice, and generally ignored question, how precisely the ‘is’ in this sentence should be understood. It looks like it
cannot be an identity predicate on pain of violating type restrictions (and thereby introducting the threat of a form of Cantor’s
paradox).
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the background is the assumption that the world is ‘carved up’ into pluralities prior to, and indepen-
dent of, our practices of referring to, and quantifying over things plurally (what we might call plural
realism). Perhaps there are good reasons to think this. But were plural realism denied in favour of
the view, say, that a plurality just is some things as picked out by an expression with a particular
sense10, extensionality would fail. This would, amongst other things, open the door to the denial
of the plurality/ group distinction11, a move which in addition to ontological economy12 has in its
favour the undoubted fact that (what philosophers generally take to be) many groups are picked out
by noun-phrases linguistically indiscernible from plural NPs. At this point questions would likely
be raised about whether commitment to pluralities is any less costly than commitment to objects
(Florio and Linnebo, 2015).
Let’s grant extensionality for pluralities then, at least for the sake of argument: problems remain
with the argument. It is taken for granted that extensionality is captured by (Indisc), where modal
operators may occur within the substitutends for the sentential metavariables. Should somebody not
antecedently disposed to accept pn accept this characterisation of plural extensionality? Here is one
reason why they ought not to: a non-singularist meaning theory for plural vocabulary could hold,
consistently with the rejection of a parallel view for singular terms, that our referential practices with
plurals are fine-grained, allowing the pluralities we track with them to come apart modally. After
all, they might insist, openess to this kind of proposal is part of what it is to take plurals seriously.
And this being so, allowing modal operators to be substituted within (Indisc) is question-begging.
None of this is decisive either way. Sceptical doubt has been introduced to Linnebo’s plausi-
bility argument, which ought perhaps to cause us to question whether we can formulate a logico-
metaphysical account of pluralities independent of developing a better understanding of the function
of plural expressions in language. We’ll return to that point in due course. Perhaps, though, we can
short-circuit that imperative for present purposes. Might it not be that formal arguments for pn are
available, showing that the contested principle follows from commonly accepted (or at least plausi-
ble) rules governing plurals? Linnebo thinks so, and supplies three arguments to that effect. To these
our attention now turns.
2.
Here and in what follows, we will work in the logic PFO+ enriched with a singular existence
predicate. For details of PFO+, see the appendix. We will allow ourselves the free use of modal
operators, and leave the syntax of these intuitive13. Linnebo’s first argument for pn we will call
Uniform Adjudication (UA). Versions of UA are supplied for PFO+ with and without an existence
predicate. Since nothing important turns on which argument is at issue, we will focus on that without
the existence predicate for the sake of simplicity.
Add to the language of PFO+ a dyadic plural term forming operator ‘+’, which takes a singular
term in its first argument place and a plural term in its second. The intended interpretation of this
operator is as denoting adjunction, the operation of ‘adjoining one object to a plurality’ (Linnebo,
2016, 11). The following seems plausible as a principle governing adjunction:
(UniAdj) ∀x(x ≺ xx + a ↔ x ≺ xx ∨ x = a)
10I take it that the view sketched here would sit comfortably with a development of the conditional direct reference theory
developed in (Hewitt (2012))
11A group being a collection of people picked out by some role or feature, such as the Supreme Court justices. See Uzquiano
(2004).
12Although an alternative view, congruent with recent advocacy of easy ontology would concede the existence of groups,
since identity conditions for groups can be supplied in terms of the corresponding pluralities, but deny their explanatory role
Thomasson (2015).
13Although we’ll take it that the background modal logic is normal
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Linnebo doesn’t provide an argument for (Uniadj), but one may be easily be found. The principle
is, after all plausibly understood as (implicitly) definitional of the adjunction operator, and as such
analytic and therefore necessary14 Given (UniAdj), the next stage in (UA) is to assume a ≺ xx. This
gives us xx ≡ xx + a by (UniAdj). We are licensed to necessitate this by (Cov), yielding:
(1) (xx ≡ xx + a)
The next stage is to argue that (UniAdj) yields:
(2) (a ≺ xx + a)
According to Linnebo (UniAdj) entails (2) within the scope of our assumption, but no proof is
provided. Let’s talk through how one might go. Instantiating the bound variable with a, application
of K to the R-L direction of (UniAdj) delivers:
(3) (a ≺ xx ∨ a = a) → (xx + a)
The necessity of identity and modus ponens give us (2). Returning to (UA), with (2) under our belts,
we can appeal to (1) and get (a ≺ xx). We discharge the assumption and we are done.
The problem with (UA) as a case for (NecInc) – remember that nothing here turns on the presence
of an existence predicate – is the invocation of (Cov) to necessitate (1). Recall that (Cov) is derived
using (Indisc):
(Indisc) xx ≡ yy → (φ(xx) ↔ φ(yy))
In the context of an argument for a component of pn this looks problematic. In order to get
the derivation of (Cov) we need modal vocabulary to be admissible in the substitutends for the
sentential metavariables. But it is doubtful than anyone who doubts pn, and so anyone with worries
about (NecInc) should allow this. For this admission expresses formally the doctrine that pluralities
are extensional. For sure, as the discussion above noted, this need not be a hard extensionality; but
then perhaps Linnebo is correct in saying that soft extensionalism is an unstable position. More
fundamentally, however, we minuted reasons to doubt that pluralities are extensional in any sense.
And even granting that, we observed that the admission begs questions about the constraints on the
semantic behaviour of plurals in modal contexts. This is a defeating worry for the use of (Cov) in
(UA). Someone not antecedently committed to pn ought only to admit substitutends in (Indisc) that
do not contain modal operators. This is not enough to derive (Cov), so (UA) is not available to the
non-pn believer. But then, in particular, it is not available when arguing which a non-pn believer;
which is to say it lacks the required suasive force.
3.
The second argument is owing to Williamson, and termed by Linnebo partial rigidification (PR)
(Williamson, 2010, 699-700). Considering a fixed domain context first, this proceeds from an in-
stance of plural comprehension:
(4) ∃yy(xx ≡ yy ∧ ∀x(x ≺ yy → x ≺ yy))
yy here is a partial rigidification of xx. Now assume a ≺ xx and consider yy, the partial rigidification
of xx. This gives us a ≺ yy. Together with (xx ≡ yy), which we have by (Cov), the derivation of
a ≺ xx is immediate. Discharging the assumption gives us (NecInc).
Linnebo considers this persuasive, but of limited value, since the fixed domain assumption is
unlikely to appeal to anyone not signed up to Williamsonian necessitism15. I doubt even that (PR) is
of use in arguing for pn even modulo a fixed domain, because like (UA) it appeals to (Cov), and as
14Those beset by Quinean scruples about analyticity are invited to reformulate this argument.
15On which, see Williamson (2013).
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we have seen this looks question-begging. Things look unfavourable also when (PR) is adapted for
variable domains. To do this, we use a different instance of plural comprehension:
(5) ∃yy(xx ≡ yy ∧ ∀x[x ≺ yy → (Eyy → x ≺ yy)])
We proceed in a similar fashion as for the fixed-domain case, this time concluding that (Eyy →
a ≺ yy) on the assumption that a ≺ xx. Appealing to (Cov) would get us (Exx ≺ a ≺ xx), allowing
us to discharge and get (NecInc) only given that (Exx → Eyy), but as Linnebo himself acknowl-
edges this is not something that somebody who rejects pn is likely to allow. If one is prepared to
grant that yy are actually all and only xx, but contingently so, what stands in the way of granting the
possibility that yy exist but xx do not?
For this reason Linnebo takes (PR) to have force against the denier of pn in a fixed domain, but
not in a variable domain context. He is certainly correct regarding the latter case, but it is unclear
that the argument is any more convincing when the domain is fixed. As we saw, in that case (PR) still
relies on (Cov), and at this point the pn-denier ought to refuse to follow. We arrive here at a recurring
theme throughout the present paper; formal arguments for pn are less successful than even Linnebo,
a sober and balanced commentator, allows. The principle does not appear susceptible to proof from
premises which are not too close to the principle itself for the proof to have suasive force. This will
become more apparent when we consider the third and final of Linnebo’s formal arguments.
4.
Say that a plurality is traversable just in case its members can be exhaustively listed. This is
straightforward in the case of a finite plurality. For example, let xx be a plurality traversed thus:
(6) ∀x(x ≺ aa ↔ x = a ∨ x = b ∨ x = c)
Linnebo says that we can assert uniform traversability, by which is meant the necessitation of wffs
such as ((6))16, thus,
(7) ∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ x = a ∨ x = b ∨ x = c)
In the context of an argument for pn this might look fatally question-begging, a point to which
we’ll return in due course. First we need to deal with the case of infinite pluralities. Here substantial
infinitary resources are required17. Working in plural L∞ω, and adopting the notation of Hewitt
(2012), uniform traversability in this case may be stated with i ranging over sufficient ordinals to
index the members of xx,
(NDIS) (x ≺ xx ↔
∨
∀i
(x = ai))
Given T in the background modal logic we can prove18 y ≺ xx on the assumption that y ≺ xx,
giving us (NecInc) for fixed domains. A similar argument is forthcoming in when an existence
predicate is predicate, giving us (NecInc) simpliciter. However, as Linnebo himself admits,
[the] premise of universal traversability is little other than an infinitary restatement
of our target claim that a plurality is fixed in its membership as we shift our attention
from one possible world to another. (Linnebo, 2016, 14)
16Note that the principle of uniform traversability for finite pluralities is not statable in the object language.
17The language of L∞ω expands that of first-order logic with identity by admitting disjunctions and conjunctions of any
transfinite length, whilst allowing only finite blocks of quantifiers. We assume, moreover, that the language is equipped with
a proper class of individual constants.
18For details see (Hewitt, 2012).
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As advertised, there is little reason to believe that an assertion of uniform traversability will do
anything to convince anyone not antecedently given to assent to pn. This much Linnebo himself
concedes. However, the other formal arguments he deploys are in equally bad shape, as we have
seen. In each case the complaint is the same: the argument will not persuade somebody not already
disposed to assent to pn, since at a crucial stage it deploys an argument that such a person has no rea-
son to accept. We know that (NecInc), and therefore pn, is independent of any normal modalisation
of PFO+, so to the extent that these logics capture pre-formal reasoning about plurals and modality
our target doesn’t fall out of principles governing thought. What is more pn has been questioned by
a minority of philosophers. Still, the author’s impression is that the great majority assent to it. Given
the use to which the principle is put in philosophy, it would be unfortunate if it lacked adequate jus-
tification; yet the position we have reached suggests that this might be a live possibility. Can more
be said?
5.
We might be tempted to think that too much is being conceded to scepticism. After all, a plural
variable ‘xx’ is supposed to formalise a natural language expression such as ‘these things’. But,
one can imagine an exasperated interlocutor protesting, if this thing is one of these things then of
course it is necessarily the case that this is one of these things, or else they wouldn’t be these things.
Unfortunately, this is simply an affirmation of faith in place of an argument: the claim that ‘these
things’ designates all and only these things with respect to a counterfactual situation is implicit in ‘or
else they wouldn’t be these things’. The expression ‘these things’ is being used to justify the claim
that of necessity these things are all and only these things. Yet it can only do this on assumption
that ‘these things’ is semantically rigid in the sense that19 if it designates anything with respect to a
counterfactual situation then it designates all and only the things it actually designates. This seman-
tic presupposition is not pn, to identify the two would be a gratuitous confusion of use and mention;
however it is clearly closely related. As we shall now see.
The formal logic of plurals is of interest because it allows us to codify plural concepts we express
in natural language and to capture the rules of deduction governing these. Were PFO+ merely a
mathematical system, understood formalistically, then there would be no barrier to importing any
interaction with modal operators we care to mention in order to extend the system. For as long as
our concern is mere symbolic games, one game is as good as another. But on the intended inter-
pretation of PFO+ as a plural logic, the metatheoretic statement which appropriately formalises the
claim that αα is semantically rigid just in case if it designates anything with respect to a counterfac-
tual situation then it designates all and only the things it actually designates is supposed to model a
claim that could be made about natural language plurals. And a meaning theory for a natural lan-
guage should be statable in (the same) natural language itself, worries about the semantic paradoxes
notwithstanding20. But now it is clear that the move to the metalanguage imposes no rigidity on
object language plurals that wasn’t already implicit in the statement of object language pn itself, for
ultimately the semantic principle for the formal language should impose nothing not present in the
natural language which is our object of investigation. In that language: ‘these things’, used in the
statement of a theory of meaning for the language, means these things. The constraint that meaning
be homophonic ensures that the invocation of the metatheory in the fashion proposed by the idignant
19The term ‘(semantically) rigid’ used of a plural NP is dangerously ambiguous. My usage here has it that αα is rigid iff (a)
if x is one of the things designated by αα then x is one of the things designated by αα with respect to any world at which
αα designates some things and x exists; and (b) if x is not one of the things designated by αα then x is not one of the things
designated by αα with respect to any world at which αα designates some things and x exists. An alternative usage would have
it that simply αα is rigid iff αα designates the same plurality with respect to any world at which αα designates any plurality.
My view is that latter claim is utterly harmless, indeed uninformative, since we have no grasp of what pluralities are, what it
is for some things to be considered as many, apart from our use of plural language. Pluralities just are what plural expressions
designate.
20I agree with Priest about this much, although dissent from his dialethic response to paradox Priest (1987). Rather I would
want to follow Rumfitt in maintaining that paradoxical sentences do not succeed in making statements (Rumfitt, 2015).
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objector of the previous paragraph gives no new suasive purchase.
Where does this leave us with respect to pn? If a widely accepted logic of plurals doesn’t de-
liver pn as a theorem, no matter which (normal) modal logic it is combined with, and if obvious
formal arguments departing from the accentuation of plural logic with metaphysico-semantic prin-
ciples concerning plurals, what possible motivation could there be for adopting pn? A temptation at
this point is to appeal to more robustly metaphysical considerations about the nature of pluralities.
Provisional on metaphilosophical choices minuted below, this gives the impression of an admission
of defeat under the guise of further enquiry. For whatever the nature of pluralities might be (and
here I already fear that language is packing its suitcase, if not quite yet on holiday: pluralities are
not entities, what could it be for them to have a nature?), it is surely something that we approach
through our canonical means of latching on to them, that is through the use of plural language. How
else can I explore what it is to be a plurality other than through attention to our plural talk and rea-
soning? Do not be misled by comparisons with the scientific study of entities of some particular
class. I can explore the nature of water through using an electron microscope: my use, notoriously,
will not settle the question. But ‘plurality’ is not a sortal of the same kind as ‘water’: it expresses
a general, formal, concept applicable across a wide range of collections of entities of all sorts and
categories. In its formality it belongs with ‘object’, rather than ‘positron’; and the prospects for a
substantial enquiry into the nature of objects, as opposed to a logico-semantic making lucid of the
place of objects in the structure of the world as approached through language, are not good.
We cannot step outside of language to study the general structure of the world in its metaphysical
purity, whatever that would involve. Such is our logocentric predicament21. What is it about the use
of plural terms – ‘these students’, ‘the Channel Islands’, ‘Pixies’ (if we take the last to be plural, and
not a singular name for a group) – that licences the application of pn? This, it seems to me, is the
only question that could give us a good reason to adopt the principle. And here there nothing in use
that proponents of the principle have thus far rallied to its support, except with respect to the proper
sublplurality of plural terms consisting of compound names – ‘Ant and Dec’, ‘2 and 17’ – and these
are not the contested cases22. Moreover, there is some evidence from usage against pn: ‘You should
be careful what you are saying; Smith could have been one of those men’, to adapt an example of
Dorothy Edgington’s23. To complain that here ‘those men’ is associated with descriptive content
(‘the men talking in that corner at this party’) is simply to shift the dialectic, and not in a manner
that looks likely to favour pn. Are plural terms associated with some kind of intensional content, a
sense distinct from their reference? What would decide this issue? A prime datum here seems to be
precisely the kind of case Edgington proposes24, and this supports not pn but its negation, since it
provides a prima facie example of an instance for which the universal claim fails.
I do not take this to be decisive. Perhaps there is an argument to be had in favour of pn that
answers this objection. It might be, moreover, that reasonable constraints on a meaning theory moti-
vate acceptance of the contested principle: what happens, for example, if we formalise modal plural
logic along natural deduction lines, imposing the familiar requirements of harmony and conserva-
tivity on rules for logical vocabulary and treating plural terms correspondingly in an inferentialist
21For the record, I don’t see it as a much of a predicament. It seems to be a serious problem for as long as we are caught
up in a picture according to which language somehow distorts our access to reality. But the picture is not compulsory. We
can, alternatively, view language as our means to grasp reality conceptually, to make its contents the objects of reasoning. As
Dummett puts it, ‘language may be a distorting mirror, but it is the only mirror we have’ (Dummett, 2014, 6).
22In many cases, the reference of ‘we’ is anaphoric for that of a compound name. Unfortunately this makes the cute example
with which the present paper began something of a ladder to be taken away once the dialectic is going.
23Cited in (Rumfitt, 2005, 120-1).
24Note that we are dealing here with a plural demonstrative, so comparisons with singular descriptions such as ‘the number of
planets’ to motivate the thought that ‘those men’ is not a genuine term are illicit. Against the objection that the sortal supplies
descriptive content we can reply that (a) it doesn’t supply enough content to secure pn, and (b) There is a case to be made
that all terms, including singular names, are associated with sortals ()(), so this line of objection is in danger of generalising
uncontrollably.
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fashion? The point is merely that the work of motivating pn philosophically remains to be done, and
that in the absence of such work the appeal to the principle in support of strong metaphysical theses
is illegitimate.
The frustrated defender of pn has another avenue of response. Isn’t to seek to ascertain the truth of
the matter as regards pn, as we have been doing, in isolation from the project of developing our best
overall theory of the world to succumb to methodological error? If the benefits of adding pn to one’s
theoretical arsenal outweigh the costs, for example in terms of sitting uncomfortably with current us-
age, then one should adopt the principle. This after, all is how science proceeds, and metaphysics and
logic are part of total science. Thus, for example, Williamson has advocated a ‘modal science’ and
has more generally stressed the methodological continuity between philosophy and science (). This
position is, to my mind, unconvincing. The disanalogies between metaphysics and the natural sci-
ences are legion, most obviously in the failure of metaphysical theories to make empirically testable
intuitions. It might be retorted that metaphysical theories can be tested against intuitions, perhaps by
means of thought experiments, these providing something analogous to the experiments of natural
scientists. The role of intuitions in philosophy has been subject to a good deal of critical scrutiny of
late and the analogy between thought experiments and experiments simpliciter has been questioned,
rightly in my view. However, even within the general methodological framework in question there
would seem to be particular concerns about appeals to intuition to support pn. For here, if we are not
to confine our attention to imagined scenarios of the Edginton type (which hardly offer unambiguous
support to pn, we will be arguing about intuitions and /or counterfactual judgements concerning ei-
ther the truth of sentences expressed using English plural terminology (‘In this situation, this would
be one of these’) or philosophical terms of art (‘plurality’). In the first case, the above mooted accu-
sation of circularity recurs; in the latter, the supposed role of intuition recedes into the background,
and we are left simply with a priori metaphysical disputation of the old school, with no obvious
similarity to the natural sciences or any other uncontroversially truth-conducive enterprise. Either
way, moreover, there is a real danger of dominant views amongst current metaphysicians on pn re-
inforcing themselves by appeal to the intuitions of the already-convinced, a procedure that is of no
epistemic value.
If what I have suggested above is correct with respect to pn then it looks likely to generalise
beyond the case of pn to other modal intuitions to which common and important appeal is made in
philosophy. It is commonplace for S5, or at least S4 to be appealed to as the ‘right’ modal logic, and
for metaphysical investigation to proceed with one of these as the background modal logic. There
are disimilarities with the case of pn: notably appeals to model theoretic semantics and to coun-
terfactuals in support of S5. In both cases, I contend that circularity worries similar to those noted
about arguments for pn arise. Establishing that will have to wait for a subsequent paper. What is
clear, however, is that in the absence of these arguments support for strong modal logics will rest on
judgements concerning iterated modalities that are at least as precarious as those concerning expres-
sions of pn in natural language. Perhaps we should just be more modest in our claims about modality.
The logic PFO+ extends first-order logic with identity. To the lexicon we add:
• Denumerably many plural variables: ‘xx1’, ‘xx2’. . .
• Denumerably many plural constants: ‘aa1’, ‘aa2’. . .
• Denumerably many (monadic) plural predicates: ‘FF1’, ‘FF2’. . .
• The logical dyadic predicate ‘≺’, which we read ‘is one of’.
Customary abbreviations and modifications of notation are allowed. We add new formation rules:
.1. Atomic wffs. Where t ranges over singular, and tt plural, terms:
• pt ≺ ttq is a wff.
.2. Molecular wffs. Where φ is a wff, vv a plural variable, and with the usual constraints to avoid
clash of variables:
• p∃vv φq is a wff.
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• p∀vv φq is a wff.
Nothing other than elements of the closure of the atomic wffs under the formation rules is a wff.
APPENDIX A. PROOF SYSTEM
To any proof system for first-order logic with identity we add the axiom:
Nonemptiness: ∀xx∃y y ≺ xx
And the axiom schema:
Comprehension: ∃x φ→ ∃xx∀x (x ≺ xx ↔ φ)
We can also introduce the defined dyadic plural predicate ‘≡’, which we read ‘are the same things
as’:
Extensionality: ∀xx∀yy xx ≡ yy ↔ ∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ x ≺ yy)
APPENDIX B. MODEL-THEORETIC SEMANTICS
Following Hewitt (2012) we will develop a model theoretic semantics for the language of PFO+.
We will restrict our attention to fixed domains and show that, even with this restriction, (NecInc) is
not valid. We will then add an existence predicate and consider variable domains. We will see that
this does not affect the result.
Let a frame F = (S ,R), with S non-empty and R a relation on S . A model M on F is M =
(S ,R,D, I), with D non-empty and I a function that makes assigments to the non-logical vocabulary:
• To each singular constant some d ∈ D.
• To each n-adic predicate, for each s ∈ S , some d ⊆ Dn.
• To each plural constant, a non-empty set (x, y)x, y ∈ P s.t. ∀(x, y) ∈ P x ∈ S ∧ y ⊆ D∧∀z (<
x, z) ∈ P → z = y)
• To each plural predicate, for each s ∈ S some p ⊆ ℘(D).
Given a model, we define a valuation function v, which assigns to each singular variable x,
v(x) ∈ D and to each plural variable xx, v(xx) ⊆ S × (D − ∅), s.t. ∀s ∈ S ((s, a) ∈ v(xx) ∧ (s, b) ∈
v(xx)) → a = b.
Satisfaction can be defined. Writing M, s v φ to indicate that v and M satisfy φ at s we proceed
as follows, with t ranging over singular terms.
(1) For an n-adic predicate ‘F’, M, s v Ft1 . . . tn iff (v(t1 . . . v(tn)) ∈ I(F, s).
(2) For a plural constant ‘aa’, M, s v t ≺ aa iff .∃(m, n) ∈ I(aa) (m = s ∧ t ∈ n)
(3) For a plural variable ‘xx’, M, s v t ≺ xx iff ∃(m, n) ∈ v(xx) (m = s ∧ t ∈ n).
(4) For a plural predicate ‘FF’ and a plural constant ‘aa’,M, s v FFaa iff ∃(m, n) ∈ I(aa)(m =
s ∧ n ∈ I(FF, s).
(5) For a plural predicate ‘FF’ and a plural variable ‘xx’,M, s v FFaa iff ∃(m, n) ∈ v(xx)(m =
s ∧ n ∈ I(FF, s).
Compound wffs are dealt with recursively:
(1) M, s v ¬φ iff M, s 3v φ.
(2) M, s v (φ ∧ ψ) iff M, s v φ and M, s v ψ.
(3) M, s v φ iff ∀u ∈ S if sRu then M, u v φ.
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(4) M, s v ∀x φ iff for every valuation w, which differs from v
at most with respect to the assignment to ‘x′,M, s w φ.
(5) M, s v ∀xx φ iff for every valuation w, which differs from v
at most with respect to the assignment to ‘xx′,M, s w φ
A wff is true in M if it is satisfied on every assignment at every world in M. A wff is valid
relative to a class of frames, if it is true in every model based on a frame from the class. A wff is
valid simpliciter if it is true in every model. The concepts of truth and validity can be extended from
wffs to theories in the natural way. Consequence is similarly defined naturally.
Theorem 1. (NecInc) is not K-valid.
Proof. Let F = ({0, 1},R). Now consider a model M. Let R = {(0, 1), (1, 0)} and let D = {pi, e}.
Consider a valuation v including v(x) = pi and v(xx) = {(0, {pi}), (1, {e})}. At 0, ‘x ≺ xx’ is satisfied,
but ‘x ≺ xx’ is not, since 0R1 and M, 1 1v x ≺ xx. Hence (NecInc) is not satisfied at 0. It follows
that (NecInc) is is invalid in M, and thus that it is K-invalid. 
The soundness of the semantics for PFO+ is proved by a routine induction on the length of proofs
and we omit the details.
APPENDIX C. ADDING AN EXISTENCE PREDICATE
To work with PFO+ in a variable domain context, we first of all add a special predicate ‘E’ to the
lexicon s.t. pEttq and pEtq are wffs25 We modify the axioms as follows:
V-Nonemptiness: ∀xx (Exx → ∃y (Ey ∧ y ≺ xx))
Comprehension: ∃x (Ex ∧ φ) → ∃xx (Exx ∧ ∀x (x ≺ xx ↔ (Ex ∧ φ)))
We modify the model semantics so that M = (S ,R,D, I,N). N assigns to each world s Ns ⊆ D,
the inner domain of s. We interpret ‘E’ s.t. ‘Et’ is satisfied at a world under a valuation iff v(t) ∈ Ns;
similarly for plural terms iff v(tt) ⊆ Ns. We can see that (NecInc) still fails to be valid: simply
modify the above countermodel such that the inner domain is coextensive with the domain at each
world.
*
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